

# Prologue

## Marine Corps Cryptologic and Signal Intelligence

By Tom Hunnicutt

The history of Marine Corps signal intelligence began with the assignment of Marines to Naval cryptologic activities in Asia in the late 1920s. In 1927, four enlisted Marine intercept operators, PFC Otto Kugler, and Pvt's William L. Kiser, Ogden E. Wilson, and Kermit W. Feist began their training in Beijing, China. They were trained on a temporary basis, only one tour of duty in the field, and they became known as the "Orange Men." -1- (Newman Pages 1-2 and 7, NSG Interview). Four Marine Captains, (Capt) Shelton C. Zern, Kenneth H. Cornell and Alva B. Lasswell were also assigned to the Naval activities and trained as cryptanalysts and linguists, and by 1935 they began to function as Officers-in-Charge (OIC) of Navy Radio Security Station "A." Capt Lasswell was the first Marine officer to be assigned at two of the early Navy intercept stations. His first assignment was with Navy Radio Security Station "C," Cavite, Philippines where he worked on Japanese diplomatic codes from August 31, 1938 to June 27, 1939. He was then assigned duty at the Navy Security Station "A," in Shanghai, China, which was located with the Fourth Marines Headquarters. Initially scheduled to leave Shanghai on July 13, 1940, he was held over until late July due to an international incident. His language expertise was needed to insure the situation did not get out of control. -2- (Newman Page 3, NSG Interview) and (Lasswell MR 3145-32B File).

In March 1936, the Navy asked the Marine Corps to establish a permanent group of intercept operators, and the Marine Corps planned to establish 20 full time billets for that purpose.-3- (Naval A-9). However, the goal was short lived as personnel shortages throughout the Corps made it impossible to achieve at that time. -4- (Naval A-10). Between 1927 and 1937 the Marine intercept operators slowly grew in numbers, but by August 1938, all the Marine intercept operators had been withdrawn for budgetary reasons with no plans to establish any viable cryptologic effort. Four of the then active enlisted Marines (SSgt Stephen Lesko, Cpl Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr., Cpl Cecil T. Carraway and PFC Clarence Gentilecore) were called back into signal intelligence duty during World War II when the Marine Corps

organized the Radio Intelligence Platoons (RI Plt). -5- (MCCA 3084-1) and (Newman Pages 25-26, NSG Interview).

Prior to 1935 Navy Chief Radiomen (CRM) served as the Assistant Officer-in-Charge (AOIC) of Navy Radio Security Station “A,” and they ran the intercept operation. While the above mentioned Marine officers took over the function of being the OIC in 1935 the Navy CRMs continued to supervise intercept personnel. The officers worked on translations and other cryptanalytic duties. This was confirmed by both retired LtCol Stephen Lesko in his Navy Security Group (NSG) interview in 1982 and Colonel (Col) Alva B. Lasswell in his National Security Agency (NSA) interview in 1986. -6- (Newman – Page 23, NSG Interview) and (Lasswell Six – Page 27, NSA Interview).

Upon Capt Lasswell’s departure from Shanghai in 1940, Marine Corps involvement in cryptologic efforts and signal intelligence ended. However, one officer, Capt Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr., remained with Naval Intelligence in the Pacific, as linguist. In late 1941, he was transferred from Shanghai to Pearl Harbor and in 1943 was assigned duty with Navy Radio Station “F” in Happy Valley, China (Chungking). The station was also referred to as a Naval Advisory Group. Holcomb spoke both Japanese and Chinese and was a cousin of the Marine Corps Commandant of the time, Major General (MajGen) Thomas Holcomb, who also signed the orders for the Marine Radio Intercept Platoons to be formed in 1942. During the Korean War, Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. was the G-2 of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, and he retired a Brigadier General in 1952. -7- (Holcomb, Bankson T – One – [www.usmc.mil/genbios2ndf/biographies](http://www.usmc.mil/genbios2ndf/biographies)), (Frozen Chosin – usmc, [www.usmc.mil/directive.nif](http://www.usmc.mil/directive.nif)) and (Mann A-24-A-28).

In April 1941 Capt Lasswell was ordered to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (T.H.) as the director of a new Japanese language course at the University of Hawaii, but upon his arrival he found himself being drafted back into the Naval Intelligence world. Then Commander (CDR) Joseph J. Rochefort (USN) had heard of Lasswell and his abilities with the Japanese military and diplomatic codes in the Philippines and China. Rochefort made him his section chief, which proved to be one of the most important assignments during the build up to World War II. Lasswell would remain there until

October 5, 1944 and then be assigned to Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in Washington, DC until the end of the war. In 1942, Lasswell's talent in code recoveries and translations of the Japanese traffic proved to be invaluable to military commanders throughout the Asiatic Pacific Theater. His first major translation concerned the Japanese Operation Order for the Battle of Midway, and it was his first major contribution to the war. The impact of his effort was a turning point of the war in the Pacific and has gone down in military history as one of the major events of the war. Lasswell was the only Marine officer in this area of intelligence at the time, and other major events that came off his desk included: (1) The Shoot Down of Japanese Admiral (Adm) Isoroku Yamamoto in 1943; (2) The Plot to Ambush General (Gen) MacArthur in 1944; and, (3) Mouse Trapping intelligence that gave tactical commanders the edge during the Island campaigns.

While the Battle of Midway caught the eye of military men and most civilians of that time, Lasswell mentions in his memoirs and during the 1986 NSA interview he felt the shoot down of ADM Yamamoto and the MacArthur affair seemed as important. **-8- (Lasswell Three – Page 6, 14 and 15 Archives University of Colorado, Boulder) and (Lasswell Six – Pages 12-27, NSA Interview).**

As World War II evolved many changes occurred concerning funding and recruitment which led to the development, organization, equipping and training of seven Radio Intelligence (RI) Platoons in the summer of 1943 at Camp Elliott, California. The personnel had received basic cryptologic training at Bainbridge Island, Washington. The platoons were designed to become an integral part of Division and Corps Signal Companies, but there was no Marine Corps precedent for organization or equipment of RI Platoons. The Platoon Commanders determined what equipment was needed for operations, likely based in part at least on the experience of the four Marines, mentioned earlier, who had served as enlisted men in the Navy stations in Shanghai and Beijing. They were then 1<sup>st</sup> Lieutenant (1<sup>st</sup> Lt) Stephen Lesko, who served as the 1<sup>st</sup> RI Platoon Commander; 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant (2ndLt) Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr., who was the 3<sup>rd</sup> RI Platoon Commander; 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt Cecil T. Carraway, the 4<sup>th</sup> RI Platoon Commander; and, Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) Clarence F. Gentilecore, Platoon Sergeant of the 3<sup>rd</sup> RI

Platoon.

Six of the platoons were deployed to the Pacific Theater; the seventh was disbanded in April 19, 1944. Their mission was to be three-fold: (1) to intercept Japanese military and naval communications; (2) to perform radio direction finding operations; and, (3) to monitor friendly communications to ensure their security. The Department of the Navy authorized the formation of the platoons; however, it stipulated that the platoons would be under the functional control of the Navy communications intelligence organization and would, therefore, deal directly with the Navy field activities and support those activities: (1) by forwarding information gathered by the platoons which could not be used by Marine Corps intelligence activities; and, (2) with concurrence of the Marine field commands to which the platoons were assigned, Navy activities could direct the platoons to perform a secondary mission of furnishing special strategic intercept service. In return, the Navy activities would provide new operating data and information to the platoons.

The 1<sup>st</sup> RI Platoon, commanded by 1stLt Lesko, and later the 2<sup>nd</sup> RI Platoon, commanded by 1stLt Marcus J. Coutts, were deployed to serve with I Amphibious Corps (later III Amphibious Corps) in the Solomons Islands.

Understandably, there was no inherent appreciation for the RI Platoon capabilities by the Corps Headquarters, and therein may lay a reason for the deactivation of the platoons after World War II. Since no appropriate tasking was assigned by the Marine tactical commanders, the RI Platoons organized their own missions and conducted intercept operations against Japanese observation posts in the New Ireland, New Britain, and Solomons Islands areas. The information was forwarded via the Corps to Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPAC) where it was praised for its value.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> RI Platoon, under 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt Petrosky, and later the 4<sup>th</sup> RI Platoon, under 1<sup>st</sup> Lt Carraway, the 5<sup>th</sup>, under 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt Walter C. Smith, and the 6<sup>th</sup> RI Platoon, under Capt John W. Webber were deployed to Hawaii and were assigned to Navy sites at Wahiawa, Hawaii and on Guam and Kwajalein Atoll where they provided valuable strategic intercept service to the Pacific Fleet and were able to receive further

training in cryptologic proficiency, which benefited them and the Marine combat forces.

All or parts of the platoons participated in most of the amphibious operations in the Central and Western Pacific from 1944 to the end of the war. The 1<sup>st</sup> RI Platoon participated in the assaults on Guam and Iwo Jima. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon participated in the assault on Peleliu; however, it suffered 30% casualties, including the deaths of Cpls Joseph A. Prete and Stephen J. Weber, and PFC William J. Hughes, Jr., which resulted in its disbandment and redistribution of its remaining personnel among the other RI platoons. The 3<sup>rd</sup> RI Platoon participated in the assault on Okinawa, and the 6<sup>th</sup> Platoon in the assaults on Saipan and Tinian. The 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> RI Platoons did not participate in amphibious assaults but provided valuable strategic intercept throughout the remainder of the war.

All of the RI Platoons prepared for the assaults on Japan but, after Japan surrendered, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Platoons were assigned to occupational duty in Japan and the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Platoons were assigned occupational duty in North China. Their primary purpose was to ensure compliance with the conditions of the treaty. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Platoons were deactivated in the fall of 1945 and the remainder in February of 1946. -9- (McIntire – ii, 83, 90)

There can be no doubt about the importance of those who had trained in China because they could copy the Japanese traffic, and the RI Plt Marines copied extremely valuable Japanese traffic throughout 1944 and 1945. One example of this came to light when then Capt Lesko stopped in Hawaii en route back to the United States. Navy officers pulled him into Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPAC) where he was asked to brief several other officers about the intercept. Until that time he had no idea that their intercept work was useful or valid, but the particular intercept turned out to be of Japanese coast watchers communicating with each other. -10- (McIntire – ii) and (Newman – Page 29, NSG Interview).

The RI Platoons were deactivated after World War II, leaving the Marine Corps without an identifiable signal intelligence capability, and while some efforts were made to correct the situation prior to the Korean War, there were no Marine signal intelligence units involved in that war.

In the fall of 1949 the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Intelligence Platoon was re-established and redesignated the 5<sup>th</sup>

Signal Company - (Supplementary), which was a reserve unit located at Headquarters in Washington, DC. Its commanding officer was Major (Maj) Victor M. Johnson, who had succeeded 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt Petrosky as the 3<sup>rd</sup> RI Plt Commander during World War II. The 5<sup>th</sup> Signal Company was later to relocate to Quantico, Virginia and then to Camp Pendleton, California. On February 17, 1951, the company was redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company.-11- (Brown 2, Vol-2, 7) and (Force Troops – Page 133).

Most of the new personnel assigned to the company and its early successors came from the communications occupational fields, and a number of them attended formal schools of the other services to acquire the unique skills required for the organization's mission. In July 1954, with Maj Judson Vanderhoof, who succeeded Maj Johnson as its Commanding Officer, 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company was relocated to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina -12 (Force –133) and (Source 13). It was redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company on September 15, 1958 with Maj Paul W. Barcus as its Commanding Officer and as 2<sup>nd</sup> Composite Radio Company on July 22, 1959 with Maj Barcus continuing in command. On September 17, 1963, under the command of Maj James R. Quisenberry, who had succeeded Maj Barcus in December, 1960, it was again redesignated 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company.

During the period of transition from 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company back to 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company, a separate occupational series, MOS 257X for enlisted and 251X for officers, was established within the Communications Field to more readily identify and control the assignment of Marines with signal intelligence skills. On July 14, 1964, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company became the 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Battalion, with Maj James R. Quisenberry as Commanding Officer. -13- (Source 13)

In the early and mid-1950s, the Marine Corps began to train more Marines, officer and enlisted, in the unique skills required by units such as 5<sup>th</sup> Signal Company (1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company). The specialized training was accomplished at both established formal Army and Navy schools, and has since been expanded to include the use of Air Force and, recently, Marine formal schools for officers as well as Marine participation as instructors in “joint” schools sponsored by other services.

In 1956-1957 the Hogaboom Board conducted a comprehensive review of Marine Corps

organization and structure. As part of the review, a group was formed under the guidance of then Colonel Raymond G. Davis, and discussions were held between the Marine Corps and the Navy concerning the use of Marines in Naval Security Group (NSG) activities and the capability of orderly withdrawal of certain numbers of Marines for duty with Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) under crisis situations. The group was also charged with determining the number, strength, and equipment of signal intelligence units to be established in support of FMF requirements.

A number of officers and enlisted who had served in 5<sup>th</sup> Signal Company, or were serving in 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company, and G Company, HqBn, participated in the deliberations which produced what would be the basis for the companies, later battalions, supporting the FMF, and agreement was reached as to the execution of crisis deployment from NSG activities to the Marine signal intelligence units when required.

The result of the Davis group's recommendations and the deployment capability of Marines serving in the naval sites being available when required is reflected in activation, phased formation and redesignation of all of the Marine signal intelligence units, not to mention gain in strength which still continues because of the proven value of these resources to Marine combat forces -14- (Source 13).

On September 15, 1958 the 2<sup>nd</sup> RI Plt was reactivated and redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Under the command of Capt. Richard James Smith(?), it relocated to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii on June 1, 1959 and was redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Composite Radio Company on July 22, 1959 with Capt Henry A. F. von der Heyde, Jr. as Commanding Officer. It was again redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company on September 17, 1963 with Maj. Richard J. Smith as the Commanding Officer. It was further redesignated 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion on July 14, 1964 with Maj. Patrick J. Fennell as Battalion Commander.

Another cryptologic unit was formed in the summer of 1954 at Headquarters Battalion (HqBn), Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). It was designated Company G, HqBn, HQMC, and located at U.S. Naval Security Station, Washington, DC on April 1, 1958 with Maj Victor M. Johnson as Commanding Officer. Maj Johnson remained its Commanding Officer until September 30,

1961. On October 1, 1961 the Company was redesignated Marine Support Battalion (MSB) and LtCol John F. La Spada became the Commanding Officer **-15- (MO 3513 Source 132)**

On May 15, 1956 the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Special Communication Platoons (SCP), HqBn, (HQMC), were formed in San Diego, California. The 1<sup>st</sup> SCP was ordered to the Naval Communication Facility, Yokosuka, Japan on May 16, 1956 and then relocated to Kamiseya, Japan. Its Platoon Commander was Capt Alfred M. Gray, Jr. who later became the 29<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps. This platoon was redesignated Sub-Unit 5 in April 1958 and as Company E, MSB on October 1, 1961. The 2<sup>nd</sup> SCP was ordered to Bremerhaven, Germany on May 16, 1956 and redesignated Sub-Unit 2 in April 1958. Its Platoon Commander was Capt William H. Allen, and his unit was redesignated Company B, MSB on October 1, 1961. **-16- (MCCHR 3263-3) and (MCCHR 3529-4).**

As indicated earlier, the relationship with the Navy grew and more Marines worked at NSG activities around the world. In addition, Marines of 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company augmented NSG efforts at Guantanamo, Cuba beginning in 1958/1959, and one or more detachments were deployed with Marine ground forces during a crisis in Lebanon in 1958 as well.

Beginning almost immediately after the redesignation of 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company and activation of 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Company in Hawaii, the strong relationship with NSG and the support of Army and Air Force units with similar missions provided for special operator training (SOT) and advanced active training with other services in forward areas, called forward area training (FAT), which helped to maintain and hone the skills of the Marines of the Radio Companies. Detachments were sent to various sites around the world to complete these training operations, and personnel were rotated to maintain the edge gained through these deployments. In addition, in 1961, 2<sup>nd</sup> Composite Radio Company tested the feasibility of using an LST as a platform to begin its support of Marine forces while at sea and continuing the support while Echeloning ashore with successful results.

During the early 1960s, Special Security Communications Teams (SSCT) were activated and assigned to each of the active Divisions and Wings. These teams provided links from the producers of

special intelligence information to the intelligence staff of the supported headquarters -17- (Source 13)

In October 1962, 2<sup>nd</sup> Composite Radio Company was augmented, per arrangements addressed earlier between the Navy and Marine Corps, by Marines from Naval Security activities, and deployed detachments in support of Marine ground forces embarked from both the east and west coast which were bound for a potential engagement with Cuban and other (Russian) forces on the island of Cuba. A detachment was also deployed by air to Guantanamo in support of naval operations and the base at that location. -18- (Source 13).

On January 8, 1962 Captain John K. Hyatt, Jr. took Sub-Unit 1, 1<sup>st</sup> Composite Radio Company to South Vietnam. Initially assigned to work with a joint command in the Central Highlands, Sub-Unit 1 moved from Pleiku in 1963 to Phu Bai, then to the Da Nang area (Hill 327) in 1965. It eventually moved to Camp Horn and was collocated with III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters. Sub-Unit 1 established platoons with Marine ground forces throughout the III MAF (I Corps) area. Its actions were sufficiently noteworthy to draw national attention and to be awarded the Travis Trophy for its efforts during the period in which Capt Russ W. Rader was OIC. LtCol Alfred M. Gray, Jr., who succeeded Capt Rader and whose tour ended due to a family emergency in late 1967, received the award on behalf of the Sub-Unit. LtCol James R. Quisenberry succeeded LtCol Gray as the new OIC. -19- (MCCHR MO 3086), (MCCHR 3209) and (Source 13, 15)

In 1968 Sub-Unit 1 was augmented with personnel and equipment from 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion Headquarters and expanded its support to the Marine forces. In addition, Marine Support Battalion and Naval Security personnel were assigned Temporary Additional Duties (TAD) to Sub-Unit 1 from 1965 and unit the 1970 period (Sources 32 and 106). On October 4, 1968 LtCol Patrick J. Fennell became the last OIC of Sub-Unit 1, and on March 1, 1969 LtCol Delos M. Hopkins brought the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion flag to South Vietnam. Sub-Unit 1 had remained in South Vietnam for more than 9 years. Maj Donald J. Hatch, who had earlier served in South Vietnam as Commanding Officer of Company L, MSB and who had previously served in 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Company and later would become its Commanding Officer, was the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion Executive Officer and succeeded LtCol Hopkins as CO for two months (May and

June, 1970) before being succeeded by LtCol Edward D. Resnik. LtCol Resnik, whose detachment of 2<sup>nd</sup> Composite Radio Company, in 1960, when he was a Captain, had reported evidence of radar operations in Cuba, brought the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion flag back to MCAS Kaneohe, Hawaii on April 28, 1971.

On April 17, 1972, Capt William P. Bau, the OIC of Detachment "N", 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion took this element back to South Vietnam for eight months. Its Headquarters was assigned aboard the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) with the Brigadier General (BrigGen) Edward J. Miller, 9<sup>th</sup> Marine Amphibious Brigade (9<sup>th</sup> MAB), with other elements were detached to various ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. -20- (MCCHR MO-3221-02), (MCCHR MC-3533),(Source 13) and (MCCHR MO 3196 Source 59).

When the 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion headquarters relocated on March 1, 1969 to South Vietnam, Sub-Unit 2 was activated at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. The OIC was Maj Leo K. Russell, who had been wounded in action on September 15, 1967 near Hill 55 while serving with 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 11<sup>th</sup> Marines, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. Sub-Unit 2 was deactivated when 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion returned to Hawaii. -21- (MCCHR MO 3260-01 Source 56) and (MCCHR MO 3194-1E Source 59).

On July 30, 1971 LtCol John K. Hyatt, Jr. assumed command of 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion. He was succeeded by LtCol Carl W. Kachauskas on September 18, 1974 and he, in turn was succeeded by LtCol Thomas J. Smyth in September 1977. -22- (3260-01 Source 56) and (Sources 02 & 72)

While this document does not address all the companies of what is now the Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, it is deemed appropriate to identify those who gave their lives while serving in that organization as well as units of the Radio Battalions and their predecessors. In addition to the three men who lost their lives as a result of the action at Peleliu, in 1964 LCpl Richard E. McKown and Sgt Paul C. Rodrigues died in a fire in the operations area of the Company E, MSB site. During the attack in international waters by the Israelis on the USS Liberty in 1967, Sgt Jack L. Raper and Cpl Edward E. Rehmeier, members of 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Battalion who were serving on the ship, were killed and SSgt Bryce F. Lockwood, who was from Company F, MSB and on temporary assignment to VQ-1 and was wounded and later awarded the Silver Star for his heroic actions during the attack. -23- (*Assault on the*

***Liberty, 176, AppO) and (Bryce Lockwood)***

The following members of Sub-Unit 1 and 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion lost their lives in Vietnam: Cpl Stephen L. Traugber, September 10, 1967; LCpl Larry A. Jones, April 4, 1968; Sgt Paul J. Kingery, May 13, 1968; MGySgt Edward R. Storm, December 29, 1969; Sgt Larry W. Duke, March 10, 1970; and, Sgt Robert Hrisoulis, January 21, 1971. SSgt Hugh M. Lynch, member of Company E, MSB, was killed in the shoot-down of an EC-121 (VQ-1) reconnaissance flight on April 15, 1969 over North Korea. -24- (MCCHR MP 3073-3 Source 59), (MCCHR 3464, 3465-1, 2, and 3 Source 31), (MCCHR 3474-1 Source 95),and (MCCHR 3475-1 Source 59).

In late 1972, a team was formed to study the current MOS structure to further identify the specific functions to be performed by signal intelligence Marines. Base on the study which was completed in November, 1973, a new 2600 occupational field was established in 1974. In 1975, the first female Marine officer, Capt Sally Stansbury, was assigned to 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion, then commanded by LtCol Carl W. Kachauskas. Additional female Marines were assigned to Companies of Marine Support within months thereafter. -25- (Source 13) and (Source 33).

Details of Marine signal intelligence for the last 30 years, except the redesignation of the Marine Support Battalion to Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, are not addressed here; however, as strong evidence of the value of signal intelligence to the Marine Corps, a new battalion was activated on August 1, 2003, when 1<sup>st</sup> Radio Battalion was divided, moving its headquarters to Camp Pendleton, California while leaving a cadre to form the 3<sup>rd</sup> Radio Battalion which was activated at MCAS, Kaneohe, Hawaii, under the command of LtCol Mark T. Aycock -26- (MCCHR MP 3419 Source 109).

As this brief summary indicates, the same names appear more than once in Marine signal intelligence history. Unfortunately, neither the extent of the repetition nor the invaluable impact of those who are named is obvious. But for the window opened above by mentioning the deaths of signal intelligence personnel, this summary has not attempted to address the contributions of the various companies of what is now Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion or the key efforts played by staff

members from HQMC to the Divisions and Wings who contributed to the awareness of the potential of Marine signal intelligence skills and the need for the product of those skills at all levels of Marine combat forces. These Marines, officer and enlisted, are legion among those who serve in the field, and this summary closes by citing their role in Marine signal intelligence success to date.